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Taxing and Tuition: A Legislative Solution to Growing
Endowments and the Rising Costs of a College Degree
I. INTRODUCTION
Colleges and universities in the United States have enjoyed
ballooning endowment growth in recent years, leading to colossal
reserves of wealth at the most elite institutions. In September 2011, for
example, Harvard University announced that its endowment was worth
$32 billion after experiencing a 21% return on investments during the
2011 fiscal year.1 Likewise, Yale’s endowment grew to $19.4 billion on
returns of 22% over the same period.2 And while Harvard and Yale are
easily the nation’s richest schools, they have not been alone in their good
fortune. At the end of the 2011 fiscal year, seventy-three additional
higher-education institutions in the United States had endowments worth
more than $1 billion.3
At the same time, the cost of a college degree has continued to spiral
higher. From 2010 to 2011, tuition and fees rose by 4.5% at private,
nonprofit colleges and more than 8% at public institutions.4 These
figures are part of a thirty-year trend of steady increases in the sticker
price of higher education;5 since 1986, tuition has grown by nearly

1. Gautam S. Kumar & Zoe A.Y. Weinberg, Harvard Endowment Jumps 21.4 Percent,
HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2011/9/22/hmc-endowmentreturns-2011.
2. Tom Conroy, Investment Return of 21.9% Brings Yale Endowment Value to $19.4
Billion, YALE NEWS, (Sept. 28, 2011), http://news.yale.edu/2011/09/28/investment-return-219brings-yale-endowment-value-194-billion.
3. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INSTITUTE, U.S. AND
CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS LISTED BY FISCAL YEAR 2011 ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE AND
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE FROM FY 2010 TO FY 2011 (2012)
[hereinafter NACUBO 2011 STUDY], available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/
research/2011_NCSE_Public_Tables_Endowment_Market_Values_Final_January_17_2012.pdf.
Despite such phenomenal wealth, nearly half of all educational endowments still sit slightly below
pre-recession levels. See University Endowments Beginning to Regain Recession Losses, CHI. SUNTIMES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.suntimes.com/news/education/10350888-418/university-endow
ments-beginning-to-regain-recession-losses.html.
4. SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., TRENDS IN
COLLEGE PRICING 2011, 10 (2011), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files
/College_Pricing_2011.pdf.
5. See id. at 13 (showing tuition and fee increases at public and private colleges and
universities since 1982).
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500%, far outpacing inflation6 and creating fears that college may soon
be “out of reach for most Americans.”7
These fears have prompted commentators to propose numerous
endowment-related legislative reforms.8 Most have focused on
mandatory endowment distributions,9 taxes on the endowment income of
wealthy schools,10 increased transparency from universities regarding
endowment use and accumulation,11 or changes to donor tax laws.12
Despite widespread academic criticism of traditional justifications for
endowment accumulation,13 these proposals have largely been met with
skepticism by scholars who fear, among other things, potential

6. See Timothy McMahon, College Tuition & Fees vs. Overall Inflation (CPI-U)
Cumulative Inflation Comparison, INFLATIONDATA.COM (June 14, 2012), http://inflation
data.com/inflation/im ages/charts/Education/Education_inflation_chart.htm.
7. Tamar Lewin, College May Become Unaffordable for Most in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2008, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/education/03college.html.
8. See Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting
the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1799 (2009) (“[C]ritics [of endowment accumulation] have
floated multiple proposals for congressional action.”); Alexander M. Wolf, Note, The Problems with
Payouts: Assessing the Proposal for a Mandatory Distribution Requirement for University
Endowments, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 591, 591 (2011) (“[L]awmakers at the state and federal levels
considered regulating or taxing university endowments.”).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, House Passes Bill Aimed at College Costs, N.Y. TIMES Feb.
8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/education/08education.html (describing a proposal,
eventually withdrawn from a 2008 education bill, that would have forced universities “to spend at
least 5 percent of their endowment assets each year”).
10. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1817 (discussing various iterations of this plan); Peter
Schworm & Matt Viser, Lawmakers Target $1B Endowments, BOS. GLOBE May 8, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/05/
08/lawmakers_target_1b_endowments (describing a Massachusetts law that would have taxed
colleges with endowments worth more than $1 billion).
11. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Charles Grassley, Sen. Grassley Works to
Build Confidence in Nonprofits with Greater Transparency (May 29, 2007) [hereinafter Grassley
Press
Release
1],
available
at
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel
_dataPageID_1502=1 2581.
12. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1818–22.
13. Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 39
(1990) (“It is not clear . . . that the sizes of existing endowments, and the ways in which they are
managed, are well chosen to serve [the] goals [of higher education].”); Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity
Amidst Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis,
63 STAN. L. REV. 699, 705 (2009) (“It is not obvious why universities maintain large capital reserves
at all . . . .”); Walkdeck, supra note 8, at 1810 (“[U]pon close examination, the common
justifications for mega-endowments are unpersuasive.”).
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unintended consequences.14 Chief among these fears is the concern that
endowment regulation would actually encourage tuition increases.15
A solution left unaddressed in the legal literature and largely ignored
by policymakers, however, is to link an endowment tax to tuition rates.
Under such a proposal, the government could tax a university’s
endowment income when the endowment grows during the same year
that tuition at the school increases by more than inflation. Accordingly,
as long as tuition increases do not outpace inflation, universities could
accumulate endowment income tax-free.
This Comment examines this policy proposal in detail. Part II begins
by discussing the rising costs of college tuition and the growing concern
over educational access. It then offers a brief introduction to university
endowments and discusses the most commonly recognized justification
for their existence and growth: intergenerational equity. This justification
and its outgrowths have been the subjects of significant academic
criticism, and scholars have suggested new theories for endowment
accumulation that cut against normative arguments for awarding
universities tax-exempt status. Part III discusses the advantages and
criticisms of the most commonly debated policy proposals related to
university endowments. Unfortunately, all of these proposals suffer from
the same defect: they are unlikely to significantly impact the affordability
of higher education.
Thus, in Part IV, this Comment argues that tying an endowment tax
directly to tuition increases represents a unique solution. Unlike other
endowment-related measures, such a tax would discourage tuition hikes
without encouraging wasteful spending. Perhaps more important, it
would not necessarily discourage endowment growth or require cuts to
current levels of funding for other important academic pursuits, such as
research. This would leave room for universities to pursue traditional

14. See Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and University Endowment Income:
The Literature’s Perspective, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 551 (2008) (“[T]here is not a strong theoretical
case for imposing a tax . . . on endowments.”); Frances R. Hill, University Endowments: A
(Surprisingly) Elusive Concept, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581, 600 (2010) (arguing that distribution
requirements will not increase the affordability of higher education or its operating costs); Waldeck,
supra note 8, at 1813–18 (criticizing a mandatory spending proposal because it may affect a
university’s spending priorities “in ways that are contrary to the overarching goal of controlling
tuition” and expressing concern that an endowment tax could prompt tuition increases); Wolf, supra
note 8, at 606 (“[A] distribution requirement will not improve affordability across the higher
education sector.”).
15. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1817.
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goals of intergenerational equity while still being closely tethered to their
tax-exempt purposes.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER ENDOWMENTS
A. Rising Tuition and the Institutional-Wealth Gap
Researchers have tracked movements in tuition for approximately
thirty years.16 During that period, published college prices have
consistently increased more rapidly than prices for other goods or
services.17 In fact, since 1981, the average total cost, in constant dollars,
of tuition, fees, room, and board at undergraduate institutions in the
United States has more than doubled.18
Unfortunately, the largest increases, particularly in recent years, have
come at public schools, not private universities.19 Statistics from the
Department of Education show an almost 90% spike in inflation-adjusted

16. See, e.g., BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that the College Board has been
collecting data on tuition for only a thirty-year period).
17. Id. An adequate explanation for this phenomenon would mostly likely require a lengthy,
multi-factored analysis. See, e.g., R. Paul Guerre, Note, Financial Aid in Higher Education: What’s
Wrong, Who’s Being Hurt, What’s Being Done, 17 J.C. & U.L. 483, 486–88 (1991) (listing twelve
possible justifications for higher-education pricing practices). Such a discussion is thus outside the
scope of this comment. It is worth noting, however, that there is a growing consensus among
scholars that the federal government’s guaranteed student-loan program is at least partially to blame
for tuition increases. See, e.g., ANYA KAMENETZ, DIY U: EDUPUNKS, EDUPRENEURS, AND THE
COMING TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 63 (2010) (“The liftoff of college tuition into
the stratosphere in the past thirty years . . . is concurrent with . . . the rise of student loans . . . . [T]he
ability to finance tuition through loans . . . has made families less sensitive to tuition increases—a
vicious cycle that leads from rising tuition to increased debt loads back to rising tuition.”); Roger
Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV.
501, 501 (2000) (“[T]he [federal student-loan] program has interfered with the educational
marketplace by unnecessarily causing tuitions to increase.”); Kyle L. Grant, Comment, Student
Loans in Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship” Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill?, 2011 BYU
L. REV. 819, 824 (2011) (“[A]s long as financing remains the primary revenue generator [at highereducation institutions], universities will continue to raise their tuition.”). To the extent these scholars
are correct, endowment accumulation could be less controversial in a world without federal student
loans.
18. INST. OF EDUC. SCIENCES, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 2010, at 493 tbl.345 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest
/d10/tables/dt10_345.asp.
19. See BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 3 (“For the fifth consecutive year, the percentage
increase in average tuition and fees at public four-year institutions was higher than the percentage
increase at private nonprofit institutions.”); see also, Editorial, Reining in College Tuition, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/opinion/reining-incollege-tuition.html (“[T]he cost of four-year public college tuition has tripled since the
1980s . . . .”).
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tuition rates at public colleges and universities from 2000 to 2010.20
Even relatively wealthy schools occasionally approve extreme tuition
increases. In 2011, for example, California’s two public university
systems, which together enjoy endowment funds worth more than $7
billion,21 raised tuition and fees by a combined 21% at four-year
institutions and a staggering 37% at two-year colleges.22
Such instances are especially troubling because of the number of
individuals and families affected.23 Public colleges and universities
provide education for nearly three-quarters of the country’s students.24
Traditionally, a core mission of these schools has been to “promote the
well-being of communities and states,”25 but tuition increases like those
in California can be particularly burdensome for in-state students who
may be reluctant to pay the much higher nonresident tuition rates of other
states’ public schools.26
Moreover, students can easily feel “shut out by the stratospheric cost
of private colleges.”27 While tuition increases at private institutions in
recent years have been more moderate than those at public schools, the
cost of a private education has long been prohibitively expensive for
many families. Undergraduate tuition and fees at Harvard, for example,

20. INST. OF EDUC. SCIENCES, supra note 18 (showing a constant-dollar increase in tuition
and fees from $2,506 in 1999–2000 to $4,751 in 2009–10 at public institutions).
21. The University of California’s (UC) endowment grew by 16.6% to $6.34 billion in 2011,
making it the thirteenth largest in the country. NACUBO 2011 STUDY, supra note 3. The California
State University (CSU) system’s endowment surpassed $1 billion in 2011 after enjoying investment
gains of more than 20%. THE CAL. STATE UNIV., 2010/11 PHILANTHROPIC ANNUAL REPORT,
http://www.calstate.edu/universityadvancement/reports/1011philanthropicsupport/endowment_mark
et.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
22. BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 3. The universities blamed the increases on state funding
cuts, while policymakers criticized the institutions for their questionable financial decisions. See
infra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
23. The CSU system, for example, serves nearly 427,000 students, while the UC system
enrolls an additional 220,000. See THE CAL. STATE UNIV., http://www.calstate.edu/ (last visited Feb.
21,
2012);
UNIV.
OF
CAL.,
It
Starts
Here:
UC
at
the
Frontier,
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/aboutuc/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
24. Editorial, supra note 19.
25. Sam Dillon, At Public Universities, Warnings of Privatization, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 16, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/education/16college.html.
26. See Jonathan D. Glater, Colleges Reduce Out-of-State Tuition to Lure Students, N.Y.
TIMES Mar. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/education/08states.html (“Even at
universities that are cutting their prices for out-of-state students, which can be triple tuition for state
residents, nonresidents still generally pay 50 percent more.”).
27. Paul Fain, At Public Universities: Less for More, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/education/edlife/01public-t.html.
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totaled $39,849 in 2011.28 Yale’s tuition was even higher, at $40,500.29
And Columbia University, which has the nation’s eighth largest
endowment, at $7.79 billion,30 charges its undergraduates $45,290 per
year.31
These figures give rise to related concerns about “a growing
institutional wealth gap” in higher education.32 While Harvard, Yale,
Columbia, and a handful of other schools have multibillion-dollar
endowments, as of 2008, more than 4,100 of the nation’s 4,500 colleges
and universities had endowments worth less than $100 million.33 While
even these smaller amounts represent substantial capital, commentators
complain that the wealth disparity creates awkward tensions as poorer
colleges attempt to compete with elite schools.34 As a 2008 New York
Times article described, less wealthy institutions “are going into fundraising overdrive,” struggling to retain faculty and, in some cases,
charging exorbitant tuition and then “scrambling to explain why their
financial aid cannot match the most prosperous of the Ivy League.”35
The problem, of course, is that less wealthy schools can never make
up enough ground to compete with the Harvards and Yales of the
academic world—at least not under the current system.36 Students at
elite private universities are arguably more willing than their peers at less
wealthy institutions to tolerate inflated tuition rates because of the
relative levels of prestige that accompany their degrees. As a result,
schools like Harvard and Yale, already blessed with extraordinary
endowments, continue to generate massive revenue with which to fund
important research programs, attract top faculty, improve physical
facilities, subsidize athletic programs, and recruit the most promising
28. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, National University Rankings, http://colleges.
usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities (last visited Nov. 2,
2012).
29. Id.
30. NACUBO 2011 STUDY, supra note 3.
31. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 28.
32. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1795.
33. Karen W. Arenson, Endowments Widen a Higher Education Gap, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 4,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/education/04endowment.html.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1803–04 (“[T]he gap in instructional spending between
rich and poor institutions continues to grow. In the past ten years, average instructional spending at
institutions in the top quartile of wealth has grown by 37%, while instructional spending by those
schools in the bottom quartile has grown by only 6%. At the same time, the amount of debt carried
by poorer institutions continues to increase.” (footnote omitted)).
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students.37 As their graduates go on to secure lucrative employment and
eventually become wealthy university donors in their own right, the
cycle perpetuates.38
Concerns about the costs of a college degree and the growing
institutional wealth gap have raised questions about whether universities
are managing their endowments appropriately. To answer such questions,
it is important to understand what endowments are and why universities
seek to grow them.
B. Justifications for Endowment Growth and Criticisms of Tax-Exempt
Status
1. What are endowments?
In a strictly legal sense, the term “endowment” refers to money that a
university may not spend. That is, “[t]rue endowment funds are” given to
a college “on the condition that the principal is to be preserved . . . .”39
While income from endowment investments may be used to fund
university activities, trust law requires that institutions abide by donor
restrictions.40 Thus, as Peter Conti-Brown explains, “[i]f one gives
money to Stanford University exclusively for the humanitarian

37. See Arenson, supra note 33 (“The wealthiest colleges can tap their endowments to give
substantial financial aid to families earning $180,000 or more. They can lure star professors with
high salaries and hard-to-get apartments. They are starting sophisticated new research laboratories,
expanding their campuses and putting up architecturally notable buildings.”); see also Waldeck,
supra note 8, at 1804 (“Rich colleges are able to spend ample funds on classroom instruction and
still build campus amenities ‘like fitness centers and wireless-Internet hot spots.’ These amenities
raise student expectations . . . . Less wealthy institutions are thus pressured to add similar amenities
by diverting funds from other purposes, including those more directly related to education.” (quoting
Jeffrey Selingo & Jeffrey Brainard, The Rich-Poor Gap Widens for Colleges and Students, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2006, at A1)).
38. As an example, Arenson’s article tells of Allan T. Demaree, a former Fortune magazine
editor, who “gladly makes donations to Princeton University, his alma mater, even though he knows
it has become one of the wealthiest educational institutions in the world.” Arenson, supra note 33.
39. J. PETER WILLIAMSON, FUNDS FOR THE FUTURE: COLLEGE ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT
FOR
THE
1900’S,
at
1-12
(1993),
available
at
http://www.commonfund.org/
InvestorResources/Publications/Books/Funds%20for%20the%20future.pdf.
40. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 722. A university’s total endowment is usually made up
of “thousands of smaller endowment funds” designated by donors for specific purposes, such as
support for a research center or library. Wolf, supra note 8, at 593. See also Cowan, supra note 14,
at 522 (“Colleges and universities . . . claim an endowment represents thousands of separate
accounts with specific, designated purposes, such as a named or endowed professorship, a
scholarship, a center, etc.”).
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elimination of the university’s squirrels . . . , and Stanford accepts the
gift, then the university may not use that gift for any other purpose.”41
Scholars and policymakers discuss “endowments” in their more
colloquial sense, however, referring to an institution’s “total reserve
funds,” which include both restricted and unrestricted sums.42 In fact,
because elite universities tend to accumulate endowment income and
build endowments with unrestricted gifts, studies suggest that nearly half
of all funds considered to be part of the average private school’s
“endowment” are unrestricted.43 Moreover, the Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act, adopted in all but two states,44
has relaxed spending rules for universities, allowing them to dip into
“underwater” endowments (i.e., endowments worth less than their
original gift values as a result of investment losses), subject to certain
standards.45 Thus, in most cases, well-endowed colleges and universities
are not meaningfully restricted in their endowment spending.46
Considering the growing concern over tuition increases, this raises
questions regarding universities’ tendency to accumulate, rather than
spend, endowment income.
2. Why do universities seek to grow endowments?
For decades scholars have struggled to explain why universities
strive to increase the size of their endowments—or for that matter, “why

41. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 722.
42. Cowan, supra note 14 at 522; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 39, at 1-13 (“The terms
‘restricted’ and ‘unrestricted’ are occasionally incorrectly used as synonyms for ‘true’ and ‘quasi’
endowment. ‘Restricted’ properly refers not to whether principal may legally be invaded but to the
use to which spending may be applied, regardless of whether that spending includes income only or
both income and principal.”).
43. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 723 (“The largest endowments have only between
50% and 60% of their funds restricted in any way.”); Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1809 (“[T]he
NACUBO study suggests that 45% . . . of the endowment funds at private institutions are
unrestricted.”).
44. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET — PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006), available at http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact
Sheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20Management%20of%20Institutional%20Funds%20Act.
45. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 719–20.
46. See id. at 703 (“[T]he law does not meaningfully restrict elite universities in endowment
spending . . . .”). In fact, scholars generally agree that universities could find ways to free up more
endowment income if they wanted. As Professor Waldeck explains, “restrictions are partially of the
university’s own making.” She points out that colleges and universities “exert considerable influence
over whether gifts are restricted or unrestricted, and, if restricted, the precise terms of the
restriction.” Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1809.
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universities maintain large capital reserves at all.”47 Yale economist and
law professor Henry Hansmann surveyed the issue in 1990, offering
eleven possible explanations.48 The theory that has garnered the most
support among scholars is the notion of intergenerational equity.49 In
fact, most of Hansmann’s other explanations are closely related to this
theory.50
a. Intergenerational equity. Intergenerational equity “captures the
concept that our contemporary society has a relationship with both past
and future generations and raises the question of how these relationships
should influence our decision making today.”51 Scholars often discuss
intergenerational equity as it relates to property law or natural
resources,52 but economists have found its principles particularly
appealing in the context of university endowments. As James Tobin
explained:
The trustees of an endowed institution are the guardians of the future
against the claims of the present. Their task is to preserve equity among
generations. The trustees of an endowed university like [Yale] assume
the institution to be immortal. They want to know, therefore, the rate of
consumption from endowment which can be sustained indefinitely.
Sustainable consumption is their conception of permanent endowment
income. . . . Consuming endowment income so defined means in

47. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 705.
48. Hansmann, supra note 13.
49. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 706 (“Of the theories that Hansmann surveyed to
explain the existence of university endowments, the idea of intergenerational equity has received the
most attention from commentators.”).
50. The other theories include the needs to smooth out “lumpy funding”; realize future tax
benefits; maintain liquidity against short-term financial reversals; provide for long-term security;
insulate the university from outside demands; ensure that certain values are passed to future
generations; appeal to donors’ preferences; serve the personal interests of university faculty and
administrators; cater to the peculiar perspective of university trustees; and conform to custom or
habit. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 19–39. Hansmann separates these theories into two categories.
The first seven (including intergenerational equity) “all involve an appeal to the long-run best
interests of society and, particularly, of students.” Id. at 32. Thus, these theories can appropriately be
considered outgrowths, or at least relatives, of the notion of intergenerational equity.
51. Keith Aoki, Food Forethought: Intergenerational Equity and Global Food Supply—Past,
Present, and Future, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403 (2011).
52. See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: Toward an International Legal
Framework, in GLOBAL ACCORD: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
333 (Nazli Choucri ed., 1993); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347 (1967).
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principle that the existing endowment can continue to support the same
set of activities that it is now supporting.53

In the nearly forty years that have passed since Tobin made these
statements, colleges and universities have continued to point to
intergenerational equity as the primary justification for building
endowments.54 Most scholars who have examined the theory, however,
have agreed that it “provide[s] very doubtful support for current
endowment policies.”55
b. Criticisms of intergenerational equity. Perhaps the most
persuasive criticism of intergenerational equity is that it does not explain
the actual behavior of educational institutions. Hansmann touched on this
point, using Yale as an example. He noted that in the early half of the
twentieth century, the school enjoyed significant increases in its
endowment with almost no periods of dissaving.56 Yet “Yale did not
withdraw substantial funds from its endowment to help it through the
financial crisis of the 1970s.”57
Recent years have seen universities repeat this pattern. Despite
enormous endowment growth from 2000 to 2007, wealthy schools made
deep cuts in their operating budgets during the financial crisis of 2008,
apparently in an attempt to preserve endowment corpus.58 As ContiBrown has described, the five private universities with the largest
endowments—Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Princeton, and MIT—each cut
their budgets by up to 15% during the recession.59 Despite sitting “atop

53. James Tobin, What is Permanent Endowment Income?, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 427, 427
(1974).
54. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 707 (discussing statements by colleges and
universities to that effect).
55. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 14; see also Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the
Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 935 (1997) (“I agree with all of Professor
Hansmann’s points, and the other intergenerational equity arguments against charitable
endowments.”); Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1807 (“On the current state of the economic evidence,
endowment spending policies do not support intergenerational equity.”).
56. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 24.
57. Id. Of course, Yale could not have withdrawn restricted funds, see supra note 39 and
accompanying text, but there is strong evidence suggesting that a substantial portion of the school’s
endowment would have been unrestricted at this time. Despite the recession of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, one study found that as of 1985, 38% of endowments worth more than $100 million
were made up of unrestricted amounts. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 8.
58. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 703 (“[U]niversities—including the wealthiest in the
country—have made significant cuts to almost every area of their budgets.”).
59. Id. at 702.
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multibillion dollar endowments,” they “laid off hundreds of employees,
froze[] salaries, halted or delayed construction projects, issued billions of
dollars in debt, canceled or downgraded varsity sports teams, and closed
libraries, among many other responses.”60 While these cuts may have
been wise financial decisions, Conti-Brown points out that they are
inconsistent with the notion of intergenerational equity: “Students
yesterday were supposed to have benefits withheld in order to ensure that
students today received at least the same benefits. Under the present
practice, however, students yesterday received benefits that students
today no longer receive, making the promise of intergenerational equity
hollow.”61
A related criticism is that schools tend to invoke intergenerational
equity as a justification for creating spending policies that prioritize
endowment growth over other important educational interests. Preserving
the endowment corpus, for example, is an overarching goal at many elite
universities.62 Even in years with strong investment returns, this can
conflict with a school’s ability to fund research or keep tuition costs
down, especially if inflation rates also increase. An example from
Professor Evelyn Brody illustrates the complication: “If the Princeton
[endowment investment] plan produced a 9% ‘total return’ . . . at a time
of 5% inflation, then 4% (applied to a moving average) remains for
spending.”63 The problem is that if 4% is insufficient to cover the
university’s operating budget, Princeton, in the name of intergenerational
equity, may decide to make up the difference by cutting programs or
increasing tuition. Either choice seems like an odd result given that the
university’s wealth actually grew during the year and may have grown
by much larger amounts in previous years. Of course, schools can argue
that if inflation constantly outpaces real endowment gains, endowment
income will “finance an ever-decreasing fraction of the cost of

60. Id. at 702–03.
61. Id. at 708.
62. See id. at 737 (“The idea that an endowment must remain sacred to the university . . . has
a long history . . . .”); Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1811 (“The endowment . . . has become the primary
yardstick by which boards of trustees judge not just themselves, but also their top administrators.”);
Brody, supra note 55, at 932 (discussing claims by university trustees that they are obligated to
protect “the real value of the endowment.”).
63. Brody, supra note 55, at 932; see also Tobin, supra note 53, at 429 (“[U]nder idealized
conditions the university can consume the noninflationary fraction of the earnings of the businesses
whose securities it holds. The remainder . . . must be plowed back to enlarge the endowment enough
to keep up with inflation.”).
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education.”64 But this would be true only if university investments
consistently failed to meet expectations and new gifts from donors were
unable to make up the difference—both of which seem highly unlikely
given the past performance of university endowments.65
Intergenerational equity is premised on the assumption that
universities will exist forever.66 This has attracted further criticism from
scholars who believe this assumption encourages institutions to focus too
little on the needs of the current generation. As economist Robert Eisner
lamented, spending policies like the Princeton plan outlined above
“reinforce and perpetuate the university practice of using endowments to
build forever for the future. Jam tomorrow, but never jam today!”67
Moreover, he argues, the idea that any school will last forever is simply
unrealistic:
Why should we act as if a university or any other institution is
permanent? We know that nothing is permanent. . . . We know that
needs change and we can anticipate that the needs for endowment
income can change. We know that populations move and that particular
universities may be in less demand in the future (while others may or
may not be in greater demand). Indeed, almost nowhere in human
behavior or in economic activity do we show a zero rate of time
preference. We are always giving more weight to the present than to the
future.68

Despite these criticisms, “endowment policy continues to seek
capital preservation, while spending only a portion of growth.”69 These
inconsistencies have led scholars to propose new theories to account for
university behavior.
c. Emerging theories. In 1990, Hansmann suggested that endowment
accumulation might be at least partially a product of the business-minded

64. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 17.
65. Despite various periods of economic decline, the “total inflation-adjusted endowment
assets held by U.S. colleges and universities grew from just over $100 billion in 1989 to about . . .
$418 billion in 2008 . . . .” U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-393, POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION: COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS HAVE SHOWN LONG-TERM GROWTH,
WHILE SIZE, RESTRICTIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIONS VARY 9 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/301008.pdf.
66. See Tobin, supra note 53, at 427 (“The trustees of an endowed university . . . assume the
institution to be immortal.”).
67. Robert Eisner, Endowment Income: Discussion, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 438, 439 (1974).
68. Id. at 440.
69. Brody, supra note 55, at 933.
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tendencies of university trustees.70 This explanation has garnered much
recent support among academics.71 Conti-Brown points out, for example,
that “because trustees come from a world where money is the primary
benchmark of success,” they may consider endowment preservation to be
their top priority.72 Moreover, since trustees generally have little
experience in the academic world, they “are often in a poor position to
exercise meaningful oversight over the actual operations of the
institution.”73
This helps explain a second emerging theory for endowment
growth—that university presidents increasingly define success in terms
of their schools’ wealth. Professor Sarah Waldeck has pointed out that
university presidents are often “viewed as the nonprofit equivalents of
chief executive officers, with compensation packages that reflect this
corporate mindset.”74 She notes that in 2006, eighty-one presidents of
private universities made at least $500,000—including twelve who
received more than $1 million—and the largest public institutions paid
their presidents comparable amounts.75 Such salaries would have been
“inconceivable just twenty years ago.”76
These changes reflect academia’s growing connection to the
corporate world. In some cases, universities have shown a preference for
hiring former business executives, rather than professors, to serve as
presidents,77 perhaps as a result of higher education’s emphasis on
fundraising.78 In fact, college rankings, like those published by U.S.
News and World Report, are often based in part on institutional wealth.79

70. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 37.
71. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 738 (“The incentives and backgrounds of
university administrators—ultimately those who make the decisions about endowment spending—
may have much to do with a hypothesized view that the endowment must be preserved at all costs.”);
Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1810–11 (citing Hansmann, supra note 13, at 37) (“Just as outside
observers use the endowment as a proxy for institutional success, boards of trustees are inclined to
use the size of the endowment as a measure of their success in managing the university.”).
72. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 738.
73. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 37.
74. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1811.
75. Id.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 738–39 (“It has long been noted that the role of the
university president is largely one of increasing the financial clout of the institution, usually by
fundraising.”).
79. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1810 (“The factors that are typically relevant when
evaluating a college . . . have values that are at best subjective. In contrast, the value of an
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This helps explain why “[a] university president who oversees a decline
in the endowment will not . . . be considered a successful president.”80
Conti-Brown hypothesizes that “an intentional spending down of the
endowment could cast a pall of failure on the president that could last for
years. . . . This could explain the heavy bias toward resolving budgetary
crises with budgetary disruption rather than with endowment
disruption.”81
A third emerging theory simply speculates that universities seek to
grow endowments out of habit. As Professor Waldeck explains,
endowment accumulation may have been a priority for so long that
administrators simply “have not paused to consider whether it is still
rational . . . .”82 It might seem far-fetched to believe that “institutions . . .
at the epicenter of American intellectual life” would ignore a question so
important to the long-term interests of students and society.83 But as
Professor Waldeck points out, “when so much emphasis has been placed
on the endowment, and for so long, at some point the endowment begins
to become the university . . . [and] criticism[s] of endowment spending
policies are perceived as striking at the very heart of the institution.”84
Endowment building out of “habit,” then, is meant to suggest not that
universities have purposely chosen to ignore the question of whether
increasing their wealth serves society’s best interests, but rather that the
issue has become distorted by tradition. As Professor Waldeck observes,
“a retreat from existing spending policies may seem tantamount to a
confession of professional misjudgment. This provides all the more
reason for mega-endowment institutions to hunker down and defend
spending (or not spending) as usual.”85
Much of the controversy surrounding endowment building depends
on which set of theories proffers the best explanation for universities’
financial behavior. Under the intergenerational equity model, current
students must sacrifice only that portion of endowment income that is
necessary to offer equal educational access and services to successive
generations—a relatively uncontroversial notion. The emerging theories

endowment is a concrete measure of a university’s success.”); Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 740
(“The absolute size of an endowment provides a clear criterion for objective ranking.”).
80. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 739.
81. Id.
82. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1810.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1812.
85. Id.
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outlined above, however, suggest far less socially beneficial motivations
for endowment accumulation. Accordingly, they call into question the
tax-exempt status of higher-education institutions.
3. Criticisms of tax-exempt status
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from
federal taxation any entity “organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes.”86 Because universities are engaged in
“educational” pursuits, policymakers assume their funds—whether spent
now or in the future—will be used to further the institutions’ tax-exempt
purposes. As a result, until relatively recently, observers have not
seriously questioned higher education’s favorable tax treatment, even
when they have questioned the motives behind endowment
accumulation.87
Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status may be inappropriate, however,
if intergenerational equity and related theories for endowment growth do
not adequately explain university behavior. As Hansmann pointed out,
these traditional theories “involve an appeal to the long-run best interests
of society and, particularly, of students.”88 Thus, they are consistent with
the requirement in Section 501(c)(3) that universities be engaged in
educational pursuits. The emerging theories outlined above, on the other
hand, “involve no such social welfare argument.”89 Instead, they fall into
a second category of theories that “suggest[s] that endowments may be at
least in part a consequence of self-interested or short-sighted action by
the individuals who support or manage universities.”90 In other words,
these theories view endowment building as the pursuit of profit
essentially for profit’s sake, rather than to further educational pursuits.91
To the extent that these emerging theories accurately explain endowment

86. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 13, at 40 (“[I]t would be premature to propose changes
in the law governing endowment accumulation and, in particular, to propose measures to limit the
discretion of universities to accumulate large endowments.”).
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id. at 33.
90. Id.
91. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 741 (“[T]he value of the endowment, to the extent
that it burnishes the university’s reputation, becomes not simply a means of accomplishing other,
more traditional university missions, but an end in and of itself.”).
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accumulation, they cut against normative arguments for awarding highereducation institutions full tax-exempt status.92
a. Nonprofit vs. for-profit. Debates about which set of theories best
explains endowment building are difficult to resolve, largely because
there is conflicting evidence on whether nonprofit higher-education
institutions have actually crossed a for-profit line. On one hand, scholars
in recent years have lamented the tendency among endowed universities
to stray from their educational missions in pursuit of revenue
generation.93 Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, for example, have
coined the phrase “academic capitalism” to describe how “[p]ublic and
nonprofit institutions increasingly engage in market and market-like
activities.”94 As the country’s economy has become more informationoriented, they argue, colleges and universities have begun prioritizing
revenue generation above other values.95 As examples, they cite the
growing emphasis on patent-producing—as opposed to publicationproducing—scientific research; the increasing number of courses that can
be taught by graduate assistants or adjuncts; the preference for expanding
distance learning and other forms of educational access for employed
business people rather than the socioeconomically disadvantaged; and
the increased focus on generating profits from copyrightable educational
materials.96
These practices illustrate what many see as a blurring of the
nonprofit/for-profit line in higher education. Elite schools, once
considered havens of “ethereal excellence, wisdom, and morality,” are
“steadily metamorphosing into lucrative enterprises.”97 Former Harvard

92. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1812 (“[W]hen the university’s proffered justifications for
its spending policies are unconvincing, and when other plausible explanations do not warrant
deference, Congress needs to rethink its tax treatment of university endowments.”). The purpose of
this Comment is not to resolve this theoretical debate. In fact, a combination of theories—some
consistent with tax-exempt status and some devoid of social-welfare arguments—might better
explain endowment growth than any single theory could alone. Rather, the point here is to highlight
what research is increasingly showing: that traditional justifications for endowment growth do not
fully account for university behavior.
93. See id. at 1805 (discussing the concept of “mission drift”).
94. SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2004); see also Gary Rhoades & Sheila
Slaughter, Academic Capitalism in the New Economy: Challenges and Choices, 1 AM. ACAD. 37, 37
(2004), available at http://www.aft.org/pdfs/highered/academic/june04/Rhoades.qxp.pdf.
95. Rhoades & Slaughter, supra note 94, at 38.
96. Id. at 39–45.
97. Oksana Koltko, Comment, Chasing Profits—Disregarding Values: Legal Persona of
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University president Derek Bok has written extensively on this
“commercialization” of higher education. He explains:
Universities learned that they could sell the right to use their scientific
discoveries to industry and find corporations willing to pay a tidy sum
to sponsor courses delivered by Internet or cable television. Apparel
firms offered money to have colleges place the corporate logo on their
athletic uniforms or, conversely, to put the university’s name on caps
and sweatshirts sold to the public. Faculty members began to bear such
titles as Yahoo Professor of Computer Science or K-Mart Professor of
Marketing. The University of Tennessee, in a coup of sorts, reportedly
sold its school color to a paint company hoping to find customers
wishing to share in the magic of the college’s football team by daubing
their homes with “Tennessee Orange.” One enterprising university even
succeeded in finding advertisers willing to pay for the right to place
their signs above the urinals in its men’s rooms.98

Although such commercialization efforts are not new to higher
education, “the size of the accumulated funds . . . , the techniques
employed to attract and multiply these funds, the types of . . . institutions
engrossed in the corporatization processes, and the level of concentration
on . . . profit-generation are new.”99
On the other hand, revenue generated from commercialization can
provide significant educational benefits to students and society; thus,
commercialization does not necessarily require a change in the way
universities are treated under the tax code (although scholars have argued
that in certain cases it should100). In fact, Congress has traditionally
refrained from placing conditions on nonprofit institutions’ tax-exempt
status unless “there was reason to doubt that [the institutions were] using
their funds for exempt activities.”101 Professor Frances R. Hill argues
that no such doubts exist with colleges and universities, since even
undistributed endowment funds can be considered “money in use,” or
money contributing to universities’ educational pursuits.102 Because an
Elite Schools and Their Destructive Tax-Exempt Status, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009).
98. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (2003).
99. Koltko, supra note 97, at 1075.
100. See, e.g., Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From “Publish or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”:
Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 89, 139–42 (1996) (arguing that the unrelated business income tax should be expanded to cover
certain types of technology transfers from universities to the private sector).
101. Hill, supra note 14, at 581.
102. Id. at 585.
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endowment produces income for current university operations and
enhances a school’s ability to secure financing and make long-term
budgeting plans, she contends that the endowment furthers the goals of
higher education even when income from it is saved rather than
distributed.103
b. The fine line. Unlike much of the legal literature on this subject,
this Comment does not attempt to disregard either side of the tax debate.
Rather, the purpose here is to stress that any endowment-related policy
worthy of consideration should take account of the competing
motivations underlying university revenue-generation practices. Those
motivations are meaningful for tax purposes not because endowment
building cannot further educational goals (in fact, the opposite is often
true), but rather because endowment building is consistent with the
501(c)(3) exemption only if it is done with an eye toward producing a
higher-quality and less-expensive education for students. Ideally,
regulation in this area will walk a fine line, discouraging endowment
accumulation when it decreases educational access or violates principles
of intergenerational equity, but endorsing endowment-building activities
that are consistent with tax-exempt educational purposes. As the
following section describes, the most commonly proposed endowment
policies have not lived up to this ideal.
III. ENDOWMENT POLICY PROPOSALS AND THEIR CRITICISMS
The debate over university endowments has led to four proposals for
potential legislation: (A) impose a minimum spending requirement on
universities; (B) impose a tax on the investment income of well-endowed
schools; (C) require more transparency from universities regarding their
endowment spending and accumulation practices; and (D) modify donortax laws to indirectly influence university behavior. Each of these
proposals is designed to encourage schools to spend more of their
endowments, but each suffers from several serious flaws.
A. Mandatory Distribution Requirement
The proposal that has garnered the most attention among
policymakers—and by far the most academic criticism—is to impose a
distribution requirement, or “mandatory payout,” on educational

103. Id.
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endowments.104 Under this measure, universities would be forced to
annually spend a certain percentage of their assets.105 Most iterations of
the proposal have been modeled on the five-percent spending rule
applicable to nonprofit foundations,106 although some have argued the
percentage should be even higher.107
While a five-percent rule would force most universities to spend
more of their endowment than they currently do,108 because the proposal
does not necessarily encourage the right kind of spending, scholars fear it
could do more damage than good.109 As one economist opined, if elite
schools spend endowment primarily to attract more prestigious faculty
and build expensive facilities, a spending rule “would have the
unintended consequence[] of accelerating the academic arms race.”110
That is, as wealthy universities improve existing amenities, poorer
schools may feel pressured to mimic their expenditures.111 Rather than
lowering the cost of a college degree, “such a policy might ultimately

104. See Wolf, supra note 8, at 591–92 (“The proposal that gained the widest traction would
have required universities to spend at least five percent of their assets each year—a ‘mandatory
payout.’”).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Charles E. Grassley, Wealthy Colleges Must Make Themselves More
Affordable, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), May 30, 2008, at A36 [hereinafter Grassley Press
Release 2], available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=c1b59ac65fb9-4770-8050-10c4e99d8b1e (arguing that a five-percent distribution rule is not too prescriptive
for universities because private foundations must meet this same requirement, and they are
“thriving”).
107. See, e.g., RICHARD VEDDER, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSITIES: ENDOWMENTS AND BEYOND 15 (2008), available
at http://www. centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/Endowment_Report.pdf (“A 5 percent
spending rule seems extremely conservative.”).
108. The average spending rate across all higher-education institutions in 2011 was 4.6% of
endowment value. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2011
NACUBO-COMMONFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS: AVERAGE ANNUAL EFFECTIVE SPENDING
RATES, 2011 TO 2002 (2012), available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/
2011_NCSE_Public_Tables _Spending_Rates_Final_January_18_2012.pdf.
109. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1816 (“Although proponents of mandatory spending
see it as a means of reducing tuition, a five-percent rule may affect a university’s spending priorities,
sometimes in ways that are contrary to the overarching goal of controlling tuition.”); Wolf, supra
note 8, at 622 (“[T]he payout will have harmful consequences, including accelerating the academic
arms race . . . and hindering colleges’ ability to respond to economic fluctuations.”).
110. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 20 (emphasis omitted); see also Wolf, supra note 8, at 613–
14 (“The term ‘arms race’ in the academic context typically refers to the competition between
schools to attract the top students by providing the best educational opportunities—as well as the
best dormitories, dining halls, and athletic facilities (although some have also used the term more
generally to explain the competition for top faculty and, in the end, for prestige).”).
111. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 20.

1683

6.WILLIE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2/8/2013 2:58 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

increase the use of resources by society for higher education, with
dubious payoffs in terms of outcomes.”112
Moreover, there is concern that a spending requirement
simultaneously demands too much and too little from universities,
depending on their particular circumstances. During periods of poor
investment performance, for example, a five-percent rule could lead “to
real endowment declines at many American institutions.”113 On the other
hand, while the requirement is “intended to act as a floor for spending,”
some fear it could become “a ceiling, with institutions opting never to
spend at a higher rate.”114
Perhaps more important, a spending rule could create awkward
internal conflicts for universities. It seems doubtful that such a rule
would change higher education’s preoccupation with endowment
building, for example, which means schools may seek additional sources
of revenue to make up for their extra spending.115 This could tempt
otherwise-conservative universities to engage in risky endowment
management strategies or, worse, simply “rais[e] tuition across the
board.”116
B. Taxing Large Endowments
An alternative to the five-percent spending rule is to tax the
endowment income of wealthy schools.117 Based on an average
investment return of 15.3%, a 2007 study found that applying a 35%
income tax rate to the 765 university endowments included in the study
could result in $18 billion in annual federal revenue.118 Under one

112. Id.
113. Id. at 16.
114. Wolf, supra note 8, at 620.
115. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1815 (“Even in a world of mandatory spending,
universities are likely to try to maintain the size of their endowments.”).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1817 (“Another idea is to make endowment investment returns subject to the
corporate income tax.”). Some scholars have also discussed the possibility of combining taxes with
spending requirements. See, e.g., VEDDER, supra note 107, at 21 (“For example, if college A faces a
5.4 percent spending requirement from its endowment but spends only 4.4 percent, a 20 percent tax
on the difference between 4.4 and 5.4 percent (0.2 percent of the endowment’s value) could be
imposed.”). A few policymakers have even proposed going a step further and simply imposing
assessments based on total endowment value, whether or not a university’s wealth is growing or
shrinking. See Schworm & Viser, supra note 10 (describing a Massachusetts plan that would have
applied a 2.5% assessment on university endowments worth more than $1 billion).
118. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX ISSUES AND UNIVERSITY
ENDOWMENTS
3
(Aug.
20,
2007)
[hereinafter
GRAVELLE
MEMORANDUM],
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proposal, Congress could develop a revenue-sharing plan and use this
money to curb the higher-education wealth gap.119 A less complicated
suggestion is to earmark the funds for financial aid.120
Unfortunately, while these proposals offer advantages that
mandatory distribution requirements fail to provide,121 they also raise
concerns regarding potential unintended consequences. Critics have
argued, for example, that if Congress uses tax revenue to fund federal
financial-aid programs, schools “can capture the benefit by raising tuition
or by offsetting internal financial aid (or both).”122
To illustrate, assume that tuition at College A is $2,000 per year. If
Congress gives students a 100% tax credit for the first $3,000 they spend
annually in tuition and fees, College A can raise its rates by $1,000 at no
cost to its students.123 While this may help poorer schools close the
institutional-wealth gap, scholars fear such a transfer of federal-tax
dollars to public colleges will discourage state funding of higher
education.124 Moreover, the side effect of higher tuition rates could
actually fuel additional university spending in other areas. According to
one study of public colleges, “every $1 in higher tuition charges is
associated with roughly $2 in higher salaries for full professors.”125
More broadly, proposals for both mandatory-payout requirements
and endowment taxes involve uncomfortable and potentially arbitrary
decisions about universities’ relative wealth.126 Policymakers have
indicated, for example, that “[a]ny legislation would probably apply only
to institutions with absolute endowments valued above a certain floor,

http://www.finance.senate.gov/news
room/ranking/download/?id=f2ca39c7-f9e7-4ce0-8e762918f9758087.
119. Herbert A. Allen, Op-Ed., Gold in the Ivory Tower, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/opinion/21allen.html.
120. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1817 (“The most straightforward [plan] would earmark the
funds generated for congressional measures designed to alleviate tuition costs.”).
121. See id. (noting that the tax would apply only when investments produced a profit and
would not require universities to dip into underwater endowment funds).
122. Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN.
L. REV. 687, 709 (1999).
123. See id. at 709 n.86 (discussing essentially the same example).
124. See Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, Financing Undergraduate
Education: Designing National Policies, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 557, 564 (1997) (discussing a similar
proposal by President Clinton and concluding that it could “create an environment that encourages
further withdrawal of state support”).
125. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 19.
126. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1799 (“With such a wide range of endowment values, one
threshold question is: which institutions are truly wealthy?”).
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such as $500 million or $1 billion.”127 But focusing on absolute
endowment size is problematic because research expenses, enrollment
numbers, and tuition rates vary greatly by school.128 Proposals based on
an “endowment-to-expense” ratio would produce fairer results, but this
basis has problems of its own, partly because universities could easily
manipulate data to avoid a potential tax or regulation.129 A few scholars
have settled on an “endowment-per-student” ratio as the best of both
worlds,130 but they acknowledge that even this acts as an imperfect
measure of relative wealth.131 Thus, any tax based on endowment size is
inherently problematic and could lead to unfair outcomes.
C. Increased Transparency
A less controversial proposal simply calls for more transparency
from colleges and universities regarding endowment spending and
accumulation practices.132 The Internal Revenue Service already requires
tax-exempt organizations to annually fill out Form 990, which includes
questions regarding employee compensation, revenue, and expenses,133
but some policymakers argue that the form should be amended to require
more endowment-specific information.134

127. Wolf, supra note 8, at 599.
128. As Professor Waldeck notes, “[t]he primary value of an endowment stems from its ability
to subsidize university operations.” Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1800. Thus, the smaller the college,
and the less ambitious its research agenda, the less total endowment it needs.
129. See id. at 1801 (“[O]ne can . . . imagine a series of Enron-like maneuvers designed to
manipulate the ratio.”).
130. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 13 (“The size of endowment needs to be related to the size of
the student body to ascertain resources available per student.”); see Wolf, supra note 8, at 1802 (“As
Congress considers which institutions genuinely have an excessive endowment, the amount of
endowment per full-time student will be its most useful measure.”).
131. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1801 (“[T]he measure is not as sensitive [to
institutional costs] as the endowment-expense ratio.”).
132. See, e.g., GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 14 (“Disseminating better
information on what higher-education institutions are doing with their endowments . . . could be
helpful.”).
133. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2011 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM
990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 22, 33, 38 (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf.
134. See Grassley Press Release 1, supra note 11 (“The public needs to understand clearer
what is the endowment of the charity . . . ; what those endowment funds are being spent on; the
amount and percentage of the endowment being spent; how those endowment funds are being
invested; the size of the endowment; what endowment funds are earmarked for specific purposes and
what are those purposes; and, the costs of the management of the endowment.”).
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There is nothing particularly problematic about such proposals
(although the more information required of universities, the more money
they will be forced to divert from educational pursuits to regulatory
compliance).135 In fact, universities might feel pressured to distribute
more of their endowment income if they know the public has access to
information about the way they manage their wealth.136 It is not clear,
however, that more transparency, by itself, would have a significant
effect on educational access or tuition costs.137
There may even be a slight danger that increased transparency could
prompt more endowment accumulation. Given university administrators’
inclination toward preserving endowment corpus,138 they may be
interested to know how little they can spend without falling out of line
with peer institutions. This could spark a race to the bottom in higher
education.
D. Changes in Donor Tax Laws
A more creative proposal focuses on indirectly influencing
endowment spending by targeting donors. Professor Waldeck has
suggested, for example, that Congress could deny tax deductions for gifts
to universities that are restricted for more than twenty-five years.139 It
could also cap deductions on donations for buildings, machinery or other
amenities that fuel spending arms races.140 The combined effect of these
changes, she argues, would be to “encourage present spending and help
direct donors away from gifts that may inadvertently contribute to the
rising costs of education.”141

135. See Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Seeks More Charity Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/washington/15charity.html (quoting Trent Stamp,
president of Charity Navigator) (“Greater transparency will mean more work for charities . . . .”); cf.
Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1816 (“While a revised Form 990 may cost more to complete, such
expenditures are unlikely to be a significant factor in a university budget.”)
136. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1816; see also Cowan, supra note 14, at 552 (“[A]dditional
disclosure requirements could pressure colleges and universities to better monitor their endowment
policies.”).
137. See, e.g., Koltko, supra note 97, at 1098 (“It is unreasonable to expect necessary changes
in the operation of law simply from a more detailed report to the enforcement authority.”).
138. See supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text.
139. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1818. She would only deny deductions for gifts to “megaendowment institution[s].” Id.
140. Id. at 1818–19.
141. Id. at 1818.
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The legal community has largely ignored this solution,142 most likely
because it has the potential to decrease the overall pool of money
available for higher education. Professor Waldeck admits that her
proposals could “cause some donors to reevaluate whether to give to
mega-endowment universities,” but she points to the many
noneducational charities that could receive donations in these schools’
stead.143 The problem is that this argument ignores the very reason for
considering endowment-related reforms in the first place. Endowment
building has become controversial only because schools have failed to
meaningfully restrain the rising costs of a college education.144 The fact
that some schools may be “hoarding” endowment income does not mean
that higher education as a whole is overfunded. 145 On the contrary,
concerns over rising tuition and decreased state funding evidence the
need for more donations, not fewer.146 To enact reforms that divert
money away from colleges and universities would only make education
more expensive for students.

142. See id. (“Neither Congress nor commentators have identified donors as a potential means
of encouraging endowment spending . . . . The relative silence about donors is curious.”). But see
VEDDER, supra note 107, at 18 (“Those wanting incremental endowment spending to meet
instructional or research needs could achieve their objective by restricting tax-exempt donations and
investment income to those areas.”).
143. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1822.
144. See GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 1 (noting that the memorandum was
in response to requests for information regarding endowment growth and how distributions from
endowments could slow tuition increases); Cowan, supra note 14, at 508 (“[S]ome have called on
colleges and universities to stop ‘hoarding’ their endowment income and to begin using the funds to
increase student aid and limit tuition increases.”); Karen W. Arenson, Senate Looking at
Endowments as Tuition Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/25/
education/25endowments.html (“The Senate Finance Committee, increasingly concerned about the
rising cost of higher education, demanded detailed information . . . from . . . universities on how they
. . . managed and spent their endowments.”).
145. See Offshore Tax Issues, Reinsurance and Hedge Funds: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) [hereinafter Finance Committee Hearing] (statement of Lynne
Munson,
Center
for
College
Affordability
and
Productivity),
available
at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=ddb36aa0-beb0-e2f8-275e-13625c509939
(“[I]n too many cases, this wealth is being hoarded instead of shared.”).
146. See MARCEL HERBST, FINANCING PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES: THE CASE OF PERFORMANCE
FUNDING 3 (2009) (“The prospects for higher education funding are generally dim: costs of higher
education often rise faster than inflation; and economic development and . . . state revenues from
taxes . . . are lagging behind because of the traditionally long periods which separate investments in
education from subsequent economic prosperity.”); Dillon, supra note 25 (“Taxpayer support for
public universities, measured per student, has plunged more precipitously since 2001 than at any
time in two decades . . . .”).
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E. The Need for a New Solution

The foregoing proposals share a common defect: they are unlikely to
significantly impact the affordability of higher education. In fact, in
many cases, they could result in larger tuition bills for students. Effective
congressional reform, if it is possible, must include measures that
increase educational access.147 At the same time, to be consistent with
the theory of intergenerational equity, endowment legislation should not
unnecessarily inhibit universities’ ability to save for the future. The next
section discusses a potential solution designed to satisfy both of these
criteria.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Few scholars have addressed the possibility of linking an endowment
tax to increases in tuition,148 but this measure could offer many of the
benefits of the foregoing proposals while avoiding a number of their
major drawbacks. This section sets forth the mechanics of such a tax in
detail and discusses both its unique advantages and potential weaknesses.
While any endowment-related regulation is sure to attract opposition
from those who benefit from the status quo in higher education, the
arguments supporting this solution merit additional consideration by both
academics and policymakers.
A. A Tuition-Driven Tax
Part of the appeal of linking an endowment tax to tuition is its
simplicity. Rather than draw arbitrary lines separating “wealthy” and
“other” universities or debate about the basis used to draw those lines,149

147. See Grassley Press Release 2, supra note 106 (“[C]olleges are obliged to carry out the
charitable purpose of providing the best education to the most students at the lowest cost.”)
(emphasis added).
148. Jane Gravelle briefly mentioned the possibility in a Congressional Research memo in
August 2007, and again at a hearing before the Senate Finance Committee a month later. See
GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 15 (“Taxes could also be imposed on endowments if
institutions increased their tuition by more than an appropriate rate such as inflation . . . .”); Finance
Committee Hearing, supra note 145, at 15 (“Another option, if the public policy concern is about
affordable education, would be to impose a tax on the endowment for schools with tuition increases
over a pre-determined threshold.”). These comments attracted little attention from other
commentators, however, who have remained much more focused on the proposals discussed in Part
III, supra.
149. See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
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the government would simply tax all schools150 that increase tuition by
more than inflation in the same year that their endowments grow.151
Conversely, as long as tuition increases do not outpace inflation, 152
universities could accumulate endowment income tax-free, with no
minimum spending requirement.153 Likewise, if poor economic
conditions cause endowment values to decrease, schools could use
tuition increases to help weather the storm without incurring tax
liability.154 The government could make reporting, monitoring, and
enforcement relatively simple by revising Form 990.155
Perhaps Congress’s most challenging task would be to define
“endowment” broadly to include schools’ “total reserve funds.”156 A
typical endowment is made up of “thousands of separate accounts with
specific, designated purposes,”157 and an endowment tax could provide a
150. The tax would apply to both private and public universities. At first glance, this might
appear to implicate federalism concerns, since public colleges are “exempt from the federal income
tax by virtue of being part of the state government.” Cowan, supra note 14, at 511. As Cowan points
out, however, “[t]he private/public distinction . . . is not particularly critical when analyzing whether
endowment income should be taxed or regulated,” in part because public universities’ endowments
“are normally not held by the state institutions themselves. Rather, endowments are raised, managed,
and distributed by ‘supporting organizations’ that independently qualify for tax exemption as §
501(c)(3) organizations.” Id. at 511–12.
151. Ideally, inflation would be measured using a government-compiled index, such as the
Consumer Price Index. Vedder notes that “[c]olleges and universities argue for using the Higher
Education Price Index” (HEPI), but he calls this “totally inappropriate” since this index “is largely
determined by input prices in higher education.” VEDDER, supra note 107, at 17. The problem with
HEPI is that when administrative costs go up—because schools give employees excessive pay raises,
for example—HEPI also rises. Colleges could thus use it to “claim that ‘higher education costs are
soaring,’ and demand larger government subsidies.” Id.
152. During periods of deflation, the legislation should probably require only that universities
keep tuition rates flat; demanding tuition decreases could be problematic from a planning and
budgeting standpoint. In any case, this point is of little consequence; since 1950, the average year-toyear Consumer Price index has declined only twice. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
CONSUMER
PRICE
INDEX
HISTORY
TABLE,
available
at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/ cpiai.txt.
153. Congress may also need to include provisions that prevent schools from avoiding the tax
by substituting higher room and board charges for tuition increases. See GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM,
supra note 118, at 16 (“Such approaches would probably also have to extend to room and board, to
prevent increasing these payments as a substitute.”). Room and board increases arguably do not pose
as serious a threat as tuition hikes, however, since students at many schools can opt to live off
campus.
154. Thus, unlike proposals for mandatory payouts—which require minimum levels of
spending regardless of endowment performance—this tax would protect universities whose
investments perform poorly.
155. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
157. Cowan, supra note 14, at 522.
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perverse incentive for colleges and universities to rearrange these
accounts in creative ways or revise their own definitions of what
constitutes endowment funds in order to avoid application of the tax. A
potential solution would be to use the definition of “endowment” in IRS
Form 14018 as a model.158
The government distributed Form 14018 to 400 colleges and
universities in 2008 in an effort to obtain detailed information regarding
how the schools manage their financial affairs.159 The form adopts an
overarching, and somewhat circular, definition of endowment assets to
encompass “the total of all long-term endowments held for the
institution’s benefit including those held by others such as
foundations.”160 It then divides “endowments” into three categories: (1)
“true endowments,” defined as “gifts to the endowment pool of which
only the return on the principal investment can be spent”; (2) “quasi
endowments,” defined as endowment funds “of which the principal can
be spent at the discretion of the institution’s trustees”; and (3) “term
endowments,” defined as endowment funds “of which the principal can
be spent after its defined ‘term’ has passed.”161 Because these three
categories essentially capture all restricted and unrestricted endowment
funds, this definition would make it difficult for universities to avoid the
tax by redefining or rearranging their endowment accounts.162
In most instances, limiting tuition increases would represent
universities’ least expensive response to the tax.163 Where exceptions

158. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 14018: COMPLIANCE
QUESTIONNAIRE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 21 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/sample_cucp_questionnaire.pdf [hereinafter FORM 14018].
159. MALVERN J. GROSS, JR. ET AL., FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR NOT-FORPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 224 (7th ed. Supp. 2010).
160. FORM 14018, supra note 158, at 21.
161. Id.
162. A potential alternative would be to simply define a university’s “endowment” to include
all money invested in a common pool with “true endowment” funds. Because most schools group
endowment accounts together and manage them as a single investment pool, Cowan, supra note 14,
at 522, and because a large portion of this pool is likely to be made up of “true endowment” funds,
this approach would probably capture the vast majority of schools’ total reserve funds. Institutions
hoping to avoid the tax by rearranging their accounts would be forced to remove unrestricted money
from the pool and forego the investment benefits it provides. Because they could respond by creating
a second investment pool for unrestricted funds, however, the definition in Form 14018, while more
cumbersome, is arguably less problematic.
163. See GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 15–16 (“[T]he tax could easily be
small and yet induce institutions to cut back tuition increases. . . . [A] tuition increase for Harvard
was only 0.1% of its endowment, so it would clearly prefer to limit tuition increases rather than be
exposed to even a small endowment tax.”). Tuition increases at all thirty schools which Gravelle
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exist, however, Congress could assess endowment income at the federal
corporate rate. Because this rate is progressive,164 less wealthy colleges
with smaller investment returns would pay less tax than schools like
Harvard and Yale.
Unlike other proposals,165 the point of this solution is not to generate
substantial tax revenue from university endowments, but rather to
encourage endowment behavior that promotes educational access.
Nevertheless, Congress could use what little funding the measure might
produce to develop a revenue-sharing plan designed to benefit the
neediest institutions.166 This would “allow the poor schools back into the
competition for the best teachers and students” with only minimal impact
on wealthy universities.167 It would also give poor colleges that pay the
tax a chance to regain a portion of their losses.
B. Advantages
Linking an endowment tax to tuition increases offers several unique
advantages. Like the other proposals discussed in Part III, the tax would
encourage universities to distribute more of their wealth, but unlike those
proposals, it would focus that distribution on college affordability. This
would de-incentivize spending “arms races”168 by prioritizing tuition
ahead of expenditures less related to universities’ educational missions,
such as adding luxury facilities and other costly amenities to their
campuses. It is not that schools would be unable to undertake such
projects; rather, they would merely need to ensure that students were not
forced to pay higher tuition prices in order to fund them.
At the same time, this proposal would still allow for significant
endowment accumulation. This is important not only because
universities claim it is necessary to provide equivalent services to future
students,169 but also because it is unlikely that any legislation could
surveyed were less than one percent of their respective endowments. Id. at 13–14.
164. See 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2012).
165. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
166. As one commentator has suggested, for example, the tax revenue could be distributed pro
rata to institutions with endowments below a certain base level. Allen, supra note 119. “The college
with the lowest per student endowment would get the highest share.” Id. This would be a better use
of the money than earmarking it for federal grants or financial aid, since such programs can create
incentives for schools to increase tuition rates. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
167. Allen, supra note 119.
168. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
169. See Tobin, supra note 53, at 427 (“The trustees of an endowed institution are the
guardians of the future against the claims of the present.”).
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remove higher education’s preoccupation with endowment growth.
Proposals that attempt to do so create awkward internal conflicts.170
This leads to perhaps the most persuasive argument in support of this
solution: it helps universities more closely align their behavior with
principles of intergenerational equity. If higher-education institutions are
“immortal,” as Tobin suggests,171 they have a legitimate interest in
saving for the future. Thus, it is important not to cut off their ability to
preserve and even build endowment corpus. At the same time,
intergenerational equity seems to demand that endowment building not
result in decreased educational access for current students.172 In fact, if
anything, endowment policies should reflect a preference for present
students because history has shown that donations are likely to continue
to flow into university coffers in the future,173 and prosperity should
increase among later generations.174 Linking an endowment tax to tuition
appropriately shifts the focus to current students by ensuring that
universities will not grow rich at their expense. On the other hand, it
maintains a healthy intergenerational balance by allowing for endowment
building once the school ensures that current students will pay no more
for their education, in real dollars, than their predecessors.
C. Criticisms and Counterarguments
It is difficult to predict all possible criticisms of this proposal,
because it has received little attention in legal literature. Nonetheless, it
seems likely that opponents would focus on the issues addressed below.
While this solution would not fully resolve all concerns, as this
discussion illustrates, the arguments supporting this tax are strong
enough to merit further consideration among policymakers.

170. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
171. See Tobin, supra note 53, at 427.
172. If well-endowed schools that cut operational budgets during recessions “violate[] the
intergenerational equity pledge,” logic would suggest that schools commit the same violation when
they raise tuition by more than inflation, especially if they do so while their wealth—and
consequently their capacity to serve the needs of future students—is growing. Conti-Brown, supra
note 13, at 708; see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
173. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 16 (“[T]here is no reason to ignore the prospect of
future gifts to endowment in undertaking an intergenerational welfare analysis.”).
174. See id. at 14 (“There is every reason to believe that, over the long run, the economy will
continue to grow in the future as it has in the past and that future generations of students will
therefore be, on average, more prosperous than students are today. . . . Thus . . . it would seem more
equitable to have future generations subsidize the present.”).
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1. Effect on needy students
Critics might argue that by keeping tuition rates low, this proposal
could actually hurt the nation’s neediest students. Many institutions fund
financial aid packages for the indigent with money paid by those wealthy
enough to afford their school’s full sticker price.175 Well-endowed
colleges raise tuition rates regularly, the argument goes, but only the
wealthiest students and families receive no financial aid.176 Thus,
opponents could claim that reducing the price of admission at the top end
will simply leave less money available for other students.
There are two problems with this analysis, however. First, the rising
number of college graduates burdened by excessive student loan debt
suggests that if universities are doling out financial aid to students in
need, 177 they are either not giving enough or leaving a large segment of
their students—most likely from middle-class families—unaided.178 If
tying an endowment tax to tuition means slightly less financial aid for
those who could have otherwise attended school tuition-free, it should
also mean lower tuition costs—and therefore less student-loan debt—for
those with just enough income to be ignored by current financial-aid
programs.179
Second, the combination of increased tuition rates and less-thantransparent financial-aid practices makes the task of financing a college
education an unnecessarily confusing one for many families. As one

175. See Kevin Kiley, Occupy Someone Else, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 9, 2011, 3:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/12/09/public-universities-question-why-they-notlawmakers-are-protesters-target (“Essentially, wealthy students who pay full tuition subsidize the
cost of educating low-income students.”).
176. The University of California, for example, will cover the full cost of tuition and fees for
students who are California residents and come from families earning less than $80,000 per year.
The Blue+Gold Opportunity Plan, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/admissions/paying-for-uc/financial-aid/grants/bluegold/files/blueandgold_factsheet_11_Eng.pdf.
177. A 2010 study showed that only about one-third of college students graduate without debt
(and the fraction may be even smaller when factoring in the number of parents who borrow to pay
for their children’s education). Tamar Lewin, College Graduates’ Debt Burden Grew, Yet Again, in
2010, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/education/average-studentloan-debt-grew-by-5-percent-in-2010.html. For the two-thirds who do take out student loans, the
average debt load has surged to a record high of $25,250 per graduate. Id.
178. See Kiley, supra note 175 (“[O]nly a handful of institutions meet full need for all
students, and even those . . . campuses that try to meet need for low-income student[s] still leave
many squeezed in the middle.”).
179. Universities, of course, would be free to use more endowment income to make up the
difference for the students they believe are hurt by the tax.
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observer lamented, “colleges have adopted complicated aid programs
and discounts that have made the pricing of an undergraduate education
at an elite college as complicated and varied as the pricing of airline
seats.”180 The effects of this reality go well beyond mere annoyance. For
instance, as Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has pointed out, high
tuition prices cause “[s]tudents from low-income families [to] fear they
won’t be able to afford college, some so much that they don’t even
apply.”181 Even if linking an endowment tax to tuition reduces financial
aid, if the tax fosters more transparency from colleges regarding the true
costs of an education, it could actually increase the number of lowincome students who attend.
2. Tuition increases during recessions
Another potential criticism is that this tax would encourage tuition
hikes during economic downturns. That is, while the tax may help keep
costs down when endowments are growing, some might argue that
universities will seek to make up for this by raising rates when
endowments shrink.
Admittedly, the tax would do nothing to discourage tuition increases
during years of shrinking endowment funds, but it is important to note
that universities already have track records of drastically raising their
rates during recessions. In fact, one study has shown that “[t]he steepest
increases in public college and university tuition have been imposed
during times of greatest economic hardship.”182 From 2008 to 2009, for
example, just as Americans were feeling the effects of “the once in a
century financial crisis,”183 published tuition and fees increased 6.5% at
both public four-year institutions and private for-profit institutions and
4.4% at private not-for-profit schools, despite a 2.1% drop in the
Consumer Price Index over the same period.184 Higher-education
institutions raised their rates by similar percentages from 2009 to

180. Arenson, supra note 144, at 2.
181. Grassley Press Release 2, supra note 106.
182. NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y AND HIGHER EDUC., LOSING GROUND: A NATIONAL
STATUS REPORT ON THE AFFORDABILITY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2002), available at
http://www.highereducation.org/reports/losing_ground/affordability_report_final.pdf.
183. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., TRENDS IN
COLLEGE PRICING 2009, at 2 (2009), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/
downloads/archives/CP_2009.pdf.
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2010.185 Linking an endowment tax to tuition may not discourage rising
costs during economic downturns, but it seems unlikely to create
problems that students do not already face under the current system.
Of course, some might argue that tuition increases would simply be
more severe as a result of the tax,186 but variations in endowment
performance should militate against this possibility. At the end of the
2008 fiscal year, for example, twenty-six of the nation’s forty wealthiest
universities reported that their endowments grew over the previous
twelve months, despite the recession being in full force.187 Under the
proposal suggested here, these schools would have been forced to limit
tuition increases, which may have prompted poorer-performing schools
to do the same.
Moreover, at some point, extreme tuition hikes do more damage than
good for colleges’ bottom line. Research has shown that “[h]igher
education is like most goods and services in our economy—as its price
rises, individuals are likely to consume less of it.”188 In fact, according to
one recent study, “especially large tuition increases elicit
disproportionate enrollment responses.”189 These responses have not
185. See SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., TRENDS IN
COLLEGE PRICING 2010, at 3, 9 (2010), available at http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/
20101027_CollBd2010Pricing.pdf (noting that in-state and out-of-state tuition at four-year public
universities rose by 7.9% and 6.0%, respectively, while tuition at private schools rose by 4.5%, all
despite a meager 1.2% increase in the CPI).
186. In a related vein, critics might argue that if Congress enacted this proposal, universities
would respond by raising tuition in accordance with inflation every year, regardless of their
operational needs. The tax obviously does nothing to preclude this possibility, but it should not
necessarily be considered a negative result. If drastic tuition increases violate principles of
intergenerational equity, see supra note 172, one could argue that real decreases in the cost of
attendance do the same. In any case, given current trends in higher education, regular tuition
increases that mirror inflation would actually represent a vast improvement for most students in
terms of the overall affordability of a college degree. See BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 3 (noting
that over the past decade, published tuition and fees have increased at an average rate of 5.6%, 3.8%,
and 2.6% beyond the rate of inflation at public four-year schools, public two-year colleges, and
private four-year institutions, respectively).
187. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2008 NACUBO
ENDOWMENT STUDY, ALL INSTITUTIONS LISTED BY FISCAL YEAR 2008 MARKET VALUE OF
ENDOWMENT ASSETS WITH PERCENTAGE CHANGE BETWEEN 2007 AND 2008 ENDOWMENT ASSETS
1 (2009), available at http://www.nacubo.org/documents/research/NES2008PublicTable-AllInstituti
onsByFY08MarketValue.pdf.
188. DONALD E. HELLER, EDFUND, THE EFFECTS OF TUITION PRICES AND FINANCIAL AID ON
ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CALIFORNIA AND THE NATION 8 (2001), available at
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/resources/education/ed2020_docs/Hellereffects_of_tuition_and_financial_aid_-_pdf.pdf.
189. Steven W. Hemelt & Dave E. Marcotte, The Impact of Tuition Increases on Enrollment
at Public Colleges and Universities, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POL’Y ANALYSIS 435, 435 (2011).
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been significant enough to stop universities from raising tuition, but they
could act as a cap on the most severe increases.
3. Donor restrictions tie up endowment funds for purposes unrelated to
tuition
Opponents might also argue that some universities would be unable
to avoid the tax because too much of their endowments are restricted for
purposes unrelated to tuition. In fact, higher-education institutions have
long pointed to this argument as a reason for not spending more of their
wealth to increase educational access.190
As mentioned above, however, research suggests that donor
restrictions do not meaningfully restrain endowment spending.191 Studies
show, for example, that 45% of endowment funds at private universities
and 20% at public institutions are unrestricted.192 Even ignoring the
portions of restricted endowment that are designated for financial aid or
tuition-related purposes,193 this should leave most colleges and
universities with more than enough money to keep tuition in line with
inflation. As one study noted, “small additional distributions from
institutions’ endowments”—in some cases as little as one-half of one
percent of the total endowment value—“could mitigate or eliminate
tuition growth” at many universities.194
Of course, a few schools have endowments with much larger
percentages of restricted funds,195 but this reality raises an important
190. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 722 (“Many have argued that . . . restrictions keep
universities from spending their endowments as liberally as they would like . . . .”); Waldeck, supra
note 8, at 1808 (“Even if an institution wanted to . . . provide free tuition for every student, it could
not tap all of its endowment to do so; some of the funds would be restricted for . . . uses that are far
removed from free tuition.”).
191. See supra Part II.B.1.
192. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1808–09 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS.
OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2006 NACUBO ENDOWMENT STUDY 61–90 (2007), available at
http://www.nacubo.org).
193. According to one study, “financial aid is the number one restriction chosen by donors—
outpacing all other areas, including research, athletics, and faculty salaries combined.” Lynne
Munson, Endowment Reform: Why Universities Should Share Their Vast Wealth and in the Process
Make Higher Education More Affordable, in UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENT REFORM: A DIALOGUE 12
(2008), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams /20599.pdf.
194. GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 12.
195. At the University of Texas, for example, only 0.5% of the institution’s multi-billiondollar endowment is unrestricted. Charles Miller, Endowment Reform: Why Federal Mandatory
Payouts Are Unnecessary, Legally Dubious, and Counterproductive to Larger Higher Education
Reform, in UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENT REFORM: A DIALOGUE 9 (2008), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20599.pdf.
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point about university fundraising. Scholars tend to agree that schools
have significant influence over the restrictions that donors apply to
gifts.196 As an example, economist Richard Vedder points to a recent
donation by former eBay CEO Meg Whitman, who helped Princeton
University build a residential facility with a price tag of more than
$300,000 per bed—“roughly the cost of a luxury hotel of the RitzCarlton variety.”197 Whitman could have restricted the money for tuition
assistance, but as Vedder explains, “Princeton no doubt told her ‘we need
this luxury facility to help lure students here that would otherwise go to
Harvard or Yale.’”198 A tuition-triggered endowment tax may force
schools to modify their fundraising practices, but in many cases this
would lead to both increased educational access and more efficient use of
society’s resources.
4. Tying the tax to tuition ignores the importance of research
Critics could argue that tying the tax solely to tuition ignores the
valuable contribution that endowment income makes to vital research
programs. Along with instructing students, conducting research has
traditionally been viewed as one of the central functions of higher
education,199 and the schools with the largest endowments are usually
the ones that support the most research.200 Opponents may fear that as
more endowment income is directed toward keeping tuition costs low,
universities will feel compelled to cut funding for important researchrelated initiatives.
To the extent that this fear exists, however, it seems largely
196. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1809 (“[T]here is reason to suspect . . . that the
restrictions are partially of the university’s own making.”); Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Christopher L.
Smith, The Sources and Uses of Annual Giving at Private Research Universities 5 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8307, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8307
(“[T]he major private research universities devote considerable resources to cultivating donors and
‘shaping’ their giving preferences.”).
197. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 20.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., John Hattie & H.W. Marsh, The Relationship Between Research and Teaching:
A Meta-Analysis, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 507, 507 (1996) (“The claim that universities exist for
teaching and research seems incontrovertible to many . . . .”).
200. For example, of the twenty-five top American research universities, as ranked by The
Center for Measuring University Performance, twenty-four have endowments worth more than $1
billion. ELIZABETH D. CAPALDI ET AL., CTR. FOR MEASURING UNIV. PERFORMANCE, THE TOP
AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2010), available at
http://mup.asu.edu/research2010.pdf. Of course, that is due in part to the fact that “endowment
assets” are included as one of the nine measures the center uses to rank the institutions. Id. at 15.
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misplaced. Because the tax would be assessed only when endowment
wealth increases, it would not encourage—much less force—universities
to reduce financial support for current research programs. Of course, it
may inhibit schools’ ability to save for additional future research, but
only to the extent that they would otherwise have prioritized funding for
research above funding for tuition. Such a limitation, while potentially
controversial, seems consistent with higher education’s tax-exempt
purposes. Colleges and universities qualify for preferential tax treatment
because they are “educational” institutions,201 not research
laboratories.202
Moreover, while there is little doubt that research enjoys a strong
connection to classroom instruction,203 it seems appropriate for tax law
to prioritize educational access above research funding. Not only does
the demand for education provide financial support for research, but, to a
large degree, research at a university is made meaningful only because of
its relationship to students’ education. That is not to say that students are
the only consumers of research; in fact, the opposite is somewhat true.204
As education becomes more expensive, however, the pool of potential
future researchers is likely to get smaller,205 and research can be

201. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
202. It is possible that a university’s research could help it qualify for tax exemption as a
“scientific” organization under § 501(c)(3). See James T.Y. Yang, Note, Collaboration Between
Nonprofit Universities and Commercial Enterprises: The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Universities from Federal Income Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 1857, 1863 n.37 (1986) (“Research
activities undertaken by organizations organized and operated primarily for educational purpose may
also qualify as scientific activities.”). But the increasing tendency among universities to direct their
scientific research toward the corporate sphere has prompted scholars to raise questions regarding
their tax-exempt status. See, e.g., JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 167 (2005) (“[T]he question of whether such
aggressive, market-oriented behavior is consistent with university’s nonprofit mission, and truly
warrants public subsidy, is an important one.”).
203. Ruth Neumann, Perceptions of the Teaching-Research Nexus: A Framework for Analysis,
23 HIGHER EDUC. 159, 161 (1992) (noting agreement among a sample of academics regarding the
nexus between teaching and research and the tendency of the two to merge); W. Edwards Deming,
Letter to the Editor, Memorandum on Teaching, 26 AM. STAT. 47, 47 (1972) (“He who does no
research possesses not knowledge and has nothing to teach.”); cf. Hattie & Marsh, supra note 199, at
533 (“It would be difficult to imagine today’s university-level teachers not being aware of recent
research, although whether they have to also generate this research to be effective teachers is very
much questioned by . . . studies on the relationship between teaching and research.”).
204. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the
University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 779–81 (2004) (reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES
IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003) (describing the
increasing corporate consumption of research)).
205. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
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expected to increasingly target corporate, rather than educational,
interests.206 In the long run, higher education will benefit from a policy
that encourages universities to save for future research at a pace that does
not interfere with educational access.
5. Universities depend on state funding
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against linking an endowment
tax to tuition is that public universities are essentially dependent on state
funding to meet their operational goals.207 In fact, in many states, tuition
rates are set by legislatures or state boards of education, not university
trustees.208 Even in states where schools enjoy more autonomy, critics
might argue that a cut in government support could essentially compel
the majority of these schools to raise tuition despite their own best efforts
to increase efficiency. An endowment tax that punishes a university for
decisions it cannot control could thus be viewed as unfair.
While this concern should not be lightly dismissed, it should also not
be overblown. The tax would likely force legislatures to accept more
responsibility for the costs of higher education, especially in states where
schools lack control over tuition rates. Many observers would consider
this a positive change.209 Moreover, the onus should not be placed
entirely on state governments. Universities often create arguably
unnecessary challenges for legislators by making questionable financial
decisions, particularly when it comes to compensating administrators.210
206. See Blumberg, supra note 100, at 91 (“The fear is that in time universities will resemble
nothing more than commercial research centers.”).
207. See Hill, supra note 14, at 600 (“Universities could not meet their operating expenses
without government grants. Universities lobby actively for government funding.”).
208. ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., MYTHS ABOUT COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS 2
(2009), available at http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7792.
209. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y AND HIGHER EDUC., RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS
IN COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY 2 (2004) [hereinafter CRISIS IN COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY], available at
http://www.highereducation.org/reports/crisis/crisis.pdf (“[S]tate leaders must invest significant time
and attention to plan for the future of higher education opportunity. No other entity—not the colleges
and universities, not the students and the families—can effectively address these issues without the
sustained attention of governors and legislators.”); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
TRANSFORMING HIGHER EDUCATION: NATIONAL IMPERATIVE—STATE RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2006),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/other/Funding_Higher_Ed/2007 July9_NCSL.pdf (“[L]egislators
have played a role in creating the crisis in higher education. Specifically, legislators have not made
strategic budget and appropriations decisions, have not set clear statewide goals for higher
education, and have not exerted strong leadership on higher education issues.”).
210. See Kevin Kiley, College Presidents’ Paychecks Raise Brows, USATODAY.COM (Jul. 19,
2011, 2:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2011-07-19-college-president-payincrease_n.htm (describing several examples of controversial compensation decisions).

1700

6.WILLIE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2/8/2013 2:58 PM

1665

Taxing and Tuition

When University of California regents blamed a $1,818 per-student
tuition increase on state funding cuts in 2011, for example, opponents
criticized the regents for handing out massive pay raises to several
university executives, including a $195,000 raise to an employee of UC
San Francisco’s medical center.211 A similar controversy surrounded
tuition hikes within the California State University system, which elected
to pay one of its new university presidents $100,000 more per year than
his predecessor.212 As one state legislator commented, “[f]or those of us
who fight for every nickel to help our kids, [the universities] make it very
difficult.”213 If schools faced the threat of an endowment tax, legislators
and trustees may be more willing to compromise—and ultimately benefit
students in the process.
In any case, because the tax is triggered only by endowment growth,
universities suffering from state funding cuts would generally not be at
risk of paying it. Government support for higher education traditionally
fluctuates in “‘boom and bust’ cycles” that coincide with changes in the
overall economy.214 Thus, legislatures are most likely to cut funding
during periods when endowments are least likely to grow. In the rare
instance that this is not the case, it seems hypocritical for schools to
accumulate endowment income while simultaneously blaming tuition
increases on the loss of state support. In fact, in such cases, an
endowment tax could be useful in discouraging colleges and universities
from using legislative decisions as an excuse to shift the burden of
profligate spending onto students.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding the steadily increasing price tag of
higher education has intensified in recent years, as universities’ wealth
has ballooned to record proportions. Commentators have suggested
numerous proposals for legislative reform, all designed to encourage
schools to spend more of their endowment income on current students.
Unfortunately, most of these proposals would do little to increase
educational access for students, and in the worst cases, they could

211. Larry Gordon, Regents Approve UC Tuition Hike, LATIMES.COM (Jul. 15, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/15/local/la-me-uc-tuition-20110715.
212. Carla Rivera, Salary Plan for San Diego State President Stirs Furor, LATIMES.COM (Jul.
9, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/09/local/la-me-calstate-salary-20110709.
213. Id.
214. CRISIS IN COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 209, at 2.
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actually foster wasteful spending.
Legislation in this area must walk a fine line, discouraging practices
that make college less affordable but supporting endowment building
activities that are consistent with the principles of intergenerational
equity. Unlike other proposals, linking an endowment tax to tuition lives
up to this ideal; while encouraging universities to use more of their
wealth to increase educational access, the tax would still leave room for
significant endowment accumulation.
Ultimately, a single endowment tax cannot solve the complicated
issue of higher-education affordability. That does not mean, however,
that Congress should exclude it as a potential option. Although the tax
discussed in this Comment would likely attract opposition from colleges
and universities, the unique advantages it offers make it worthy of
additional consideration.
Matt Willie
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